* Hume's focus in philosophy was on the human mind, which inevitably led him to investigation of the nature of consciousness. It wasn't an entirely satisfactory investigation, Hume having to beat a quick retreat, but it pointed to the future. In any case, his skeptical-empirical philosophy was undamaged, and Hume was able to give a robust defense of it.
* On approaching the end of the 1ST ENQUIRY, it's useful to take a side trip into Hume's thoughts on consciousness and the operations of the mind. Again, philosophy is all about "questions about questions", "thinking about thinking". That inevitably led Hume to consideration of the nature of consciousness in the human mind -- though it would prove a frustrating exercise.
Humans have long been inclined to model our mind as manifesting a "spirit" or "soul", an immaterial entity inhabiting a meat body. One of the first to try to nail down that fuzzy idea was French philosopher Rene Descartes, a century before Hume, who judged the seat of the soul to be the pineal gland deep in the brain. He reasoned so because the brain is split into left and right halves; the pineal gland bridges the two, suggesting it is of central importance to the brain's traffic.
It isn't; we know now that it's a gland that helps maintain the sleep cycle. Descartes made a more fundamental error in his attempt to find the residence of the soul, since in doing so he formalized what is now called "Cartesian duality" or "Cartesian dualism". A cartoonish way of thinking of Cartesian dualism as an "inner self" -- a little person, a "homunculus", in our heads who observes the world outside through the "Cartesian theater" of our eyes, ears, and other senses; or similarly observes memories; or the processes and results of reasonings.
In reality, Cartesian dualism is silly. After all, if we have a conscious mind because we have an inner self, then where does the homunculus get his conscious mind? If the answer is: "He just does, it just is so!" -- then why bother to invoke an inner self? Why not just claim consciousness "just is so", and dump the excess baggage? Or do we claim the inner self has another inner self at the next level down? Is there yet another inner self below that level as well? And so on, more inner selves forever.
Hume was the first to challenge the idea of an inner self -- actually, he was the first as far as mainstream philosophy is concerned, the notion having been at least implicit in Buddhism long before, and Hume may have been tipped off by studying Buddhism. In any case, as Hume put it in his TREATISE, he could not see that the stream of consciousness in the mind was more than:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
... a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement ... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
END_QUOTE
Our stream of consciousness, as per Hume, is a sequence of dynamic processes that imply awareness -- the acts of seeing, of hearing, of visualizing, of remembering, of reasoning, and so on. When we have no perceptions, when we have no thoughts, then we are not conscious. The stream of consciousness amounts to a shifting and conflicting focus of attention between the processes, with the sense of "self" provided by their melting together through short-term memory into a "bundle" or "gestalt" of the individual components.
Put simply, humans are "perceivers", simply because they perceive, and necessarily perceive themselves perceiving. We are aware that we are aware, the mind providing a mirror of itself. The idea that we are perceivers because we have some "inner self" or "inner perceiver" is passing the buck, talking in circles, saying nothing interesting; the "inner self" is just so much excess baggage, we just perceive and that's it, the buck stops there.
Once grasped, this "monist" view of consciousness -- as opposed to the dualist view of the mind advocated by Descartes -- seems hardly alarming, since it in no way changes our awareness of existence. It's like the old gag about the person who was startled to find out he'd been speaking prose all his life, and hadn't realized it.
The monist point of view honestly is problematic, however, since from Hume's time it has often and unfortunately been expressed as: "Self is an illusion." That is often interpreted as Hume saying he didn't believe he really existed. Nonsense. He had no issue with the idea that humans are aware and are perceivers, that each had a unique set of experiences and memories, that each had a mind; he just did not see that the notion of some "inner perceiver" was justified, or even made any sense.
Indeed, since the "inner self" can be identified with the mind, Hume has been accused of saying that humans have no mind. Nonsense again; if we identify the stream of consciousness, backed up by our store of memories, as the mind, there's absolutely no difficulty. The mind isn't a "thing in itself"; it's no more or less than the elaborate and structured set of behaviors generated by the brain -- feeling, perception, thought, action. Hume didn't think he was saying anything particularly outrageous once matters were properly understood:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
... all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity ... are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties ... All the disputes ... are merely verbal, except so far as [such a consideration] gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union [an inner self] ...
END_QUOTE
Despite that, Hume found himself on shaky ground, becoming the target of outraged criticisms. He was intellectually cautious, fast to give up positions he knew he couldn't defend; he quickly repudiated his comments on the self. He mentioned them later in his DIALOGUES:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable.
END_QUOTE
This was a more polished version of his comments from the TREATISE. It was merely a parting shot, because Hume -- apparently to avoid tiresome controversy -- made sure the DIALOGUES weren't published until after his death.
Hume did, however, discuss the soul in a neatly concise essay titled "On The Immortality Of The Soul", mentioned earlier. The essay began on a cynical note, suggesting there was no reason at all to believe that people had immortal souls, other than scripture said so:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the Immortality of the Soul; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral or physical. But in reality 'tis the Gospel and the Gospel alone, that has brought life and immortality to light.
END_QUOTE
Hume could not make such a declaration without backing it up, and he did so in three steps, first starting with metaphysical considerations. He considered the long-standing argument for an immaterial soul on the basis that the mind is immaterial, and therefore it must have an immaterial basis in the soul: "Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis impossible for thought to belong to a material substance."
This is a confusion over the fact that the mind is no more or less than a structured set of behaviors generated by the brain; the brain's a perfectly material thing that can be, say, weighed, but that's obviously not true of the behaviors generated from it. We can observe the behaviors in action, they're material to that extent, but we can't weigh them.
Hume, however, accepted the logic of that argument of immaterialism at face value, and showed it went nowhere. As Hume said: "Matter ... and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other."
All we know about matter is what we observe of it; we cannot determine through logical processes what properties it should or should not have. By definition, we can't observe the immaterial at all, and so we have no real idea of what properties it has. If we arbitrarily declare that some unseen immaterial property is needed to support the mind, we have no way of showing that matter doesn't have that same immaterial property. We can obtain no logical leverage with such an argument of ignorance. The soul ends up being another "necessary connection" that is neither observed nor observable in any reliable way.
Hume also pointed out another confusion, a peculiar asymmetry, in that the immortality of the soul implies an existence without beginning or end. However, the lack of a beginning is generally disregarded, with consideration focused on the lack of an end: "The Soul ... if immortal, existed before our birth; and if the former existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter." If we dismiss the notion of life before birth -- as most people do, since it's a consideration of no practical consequence -- then why do we take the idea of life after death more seriously?
That said, Hume went on to the moral argument for immortality -- or in simple terms, humans need the threat of Hell to keep them on the straight and narrow. His comments on that matter are not of much interest in the discussion here, and he made that argument more substantially elsewhere. Enough to say that Hume, reflecting on the common weaknesses of humans, found that eternal punishment would be wildly disproportionate and unjust retribution for even the worst of them.
Finally, Hume turned to empirical observations of the real world, showing that -- effectively by definition -- we can have no evidence of unseen worlds, and that the idea of an immaterial and immortal soul isn't supported by any experience:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, tho' in a more imperfect manner than men [that is, they have minds, if more limited ones]; are their souls also immaterial and immortal?
Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion in the soul.
The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness; their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers are disorder, weakness, insensibility, and stupidity, the fore-runners of its annihilation. The farther progress of the same causes increasing, the same effects totally extinguish it.
END_QUOTE
If our minds are rooted in some invisible property and not the body, then why does the mind falter as the body falters? Why would intoxicants and drugs have such dramatic effects on the mind? Why do we become so stupid when we haven't eaten? In his DIALOGUES, Hume suggested that the notion of the immortal soul wasn't universally appreciated by ancient scholars, since their experience suggested nothing of the sort:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
Nothing more repugnant to all their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in both, they likewise knew, after the same manner ...
END_QUOTE
The major motivation in making a case for an immaterial basis of the mind is to support the notion of life after death. However:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
Nothing in this world is perpetual, every thing however seemingly firm is in continual flux and change, the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble?
END_QUOTE
We know of no artificial or natural structure that lasts forever. We associate such permanence as we know with items of solidity and durability: diamonds, mountains, planets. Such enduring objects are also by no means indestructible, and they are static -- unlike a living organism, changing only slowly and gradually through the course of their existence, unless devastated by some accident. When, in contrast, we try to grasp the immaterial, we envision disordered wisps that are evasive and transient in their form and behavior, easily and permanently dispersed.
On what basis other than pure speculation can we claim there exists an immaterial structure that is indestructible, immortal? Hume said: "Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on the pretext of a bare possibility?"
Simply because something might be true gives no basis for believing it is true. We could, in reply, claim that only material substance can generate the mind, that the evidently vaporous, unstructured, and fleeting nature of the immaterial prevents it from performing any heavy cognitive lifting, or any lifting at all. Could we realistically imagine a fire, a dance of fluctuating and turbulent flows of energy, as having a mind? Even if we could show that such a thing is possible, we could hardly claim the fire is immortal; all fires burn out in time. As Hume put it on his deathbed: "It is a most unreasonable fancy that we should exist forever."
Besides, as Hume mentioned earlier, if we can assume the survival of the soul after death, then we can with every bit as much justification believe that it existed before birth -- or not, with Hume adding: "Our insensibility before the composition of the body, seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after dissolution."
Hume ended the essay, as it began, on the same sarcastic note:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions, and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious. ... By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvelous a scene?
Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth.
END_QUOTE
BACK_TO_TOP* Hume, having completed his arguments, followed up the starting essay of the 1ST ENQUIRY, "The Two Species Of Philosophy", with a matching closing essay, "Of The Academical Or Sceptical Philosophy" -- making a case for his skeptical empiricism as an approach to philosophy. He began the essay on a mocking note:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? >The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters.<
The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or speculation.
END_QUOTE
What sensible objection could the devout have to skepticism? If the devout feel they have something important to say, how could they demand -- as they often do -- that it be accepted without question? It is absurd to think that it would be. To be sure, an excessive skepticism, is nonsensical, classically associated with the teachings of Pyrrho, is nonsensical:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
There is a species of scepticism ... which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.
But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
END_QUOTE
Taken to its extreme, skepticism would reduce us to a state of permanent and useless ignorance. Yes, we can't prove the Sun will rise tomorrow morning, but only a silly person would make an issue of that. Of course, skepticism does make sense if it instead encourages intellectual caution, with which Hume was very much endowed:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.
END_QUOTE
Outside of that prudent caution, it is preposterous -- contrary to the way we live our lives -- to say that humans can place no confidence in the evidence of their senses:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
END_QUOTE
Can we believe there is a material reality that exists, whether we are around to observe it or not? We have absolutely no choice but to believe so:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
END_QUOTE
Of course, there had been many philosophers to Hume's time who disagreed with that, constructing systems of arguments to deny the evidence of the senses, but to no good result:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
... here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. ... And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.
... It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
END_QUOTE
As Hume understood, there was an absurd circularity in denying the evidence of one's senses, because we have no other means of determining how the Universe works. What evidence of our senses could tell us that we cannot believe the evidence of our senses? Yes, our senses often mislead us, but it is the evidence of our senses, pursued with greater caution and diligence, that proves that we have been misled. If we're not sure of what we see, we double-check. Hume then went on to take a dig at Bishop Berkeley:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.
END_QUOTE
This is pure Hume: If God is the guarantor of our perceptions, then our perceptions should be infallible. If we can't assume an external world, then we have no basis for assuming the Deity either. Berkeley's excess of skepticism goes nowhere, and in practice we have no use for such:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
>These objections are but weak.< For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life.
These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, >are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.<
... here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer.
... [such a skeptic] cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, >he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.<
All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. >Nature is always too strong for principle.< And though [he] may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.
When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.
END_QUOTE
Hume was more directly critical of Berkeley in a footnote to the 1ST ENQUIRY:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
... all his arguments, though otherwise intended ... admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.
END_QUOTE
It is easy to ask questions that have no real answers, but such questions serve no useful purpose. In practice, we are better off to embrace a "mitigated skepticism" that, through intellectual caution, is much more prudent and practical:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this ... excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection.
The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments.
To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief.
But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists.
... if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of [skepticism] might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
END_QUOTE
Hume added that mitigated skepticism also meant being careful that investigations never leave the practical plane and take off, ungrounded and without restraint, into flights of unbounded fancy:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
... the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The imagination of man is ... delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it.
A correct Judgement observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians.
... While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?
... It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion.
END_QUOTE
If we go beyond that which we can reliably observe, then we are freed from all constraints. We can go absolutely anywhere, but that ends up being nowhere in particular. That is fun for creating amusing fantasies -- but fantasies cannot sensibly be confused with the real world. Yes, when Hume spoke of science as necessarily limited to matters of "quantity and number", he glossed over the fact the science doesn't always deal with matters that are easily or usefully reduced to numbers -- for example, the study of consciousness. In more modern terms we speak, in rough equivalence, of "observables and measurables".
Finally, Hume listed the fields of intellectual inquiry in three categories -- the empirical, the theological, and the moral:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.
END_QUOTE
Hume rightly saw nothing really controversial about empirical studies -- broadly speaking the sciences, though Hume extended them to reasonings about "common life". In a sense, they're not fundamentally exercises in reason and logic; they're exercises in observation on which reasonings and logic are based.
As far as moral subjects go, they are ultimately emotional, matters of a consensus of values and tastes. The distinction of what sort of conduct we find acceptable and what sort of food we find acceptable is a difference in degree, not in kind. To be sure, there are reasonings involved, but they are derived from fundamental premises that are based on collective preference. This remark opens the door to Hume's 2ND ENQUIRY, on morals.
Sandwiched between those two bookends, Hume inserted a sideways comment on theology. Hume suggested it is partly based on reasonings and observable facts -- but, he hints, not really; it's actually based on faith and revelation. In the very last paragraph of the 1ST ENQUIRY, he concludes that faith and revelation amount to merely walking on air:
BEGIN_QUOTE:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. >Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.<
END_QUOTE
BACK_TO_TOP* I never had much interest in David Hume until well into middle age. I had once read quickly through "Of Miracles" and shrugged, finding it fairly ordinary debunking. Much later, I ran across a comment that pointed out, as per Hume, people do not perceive cause.
That was most puzzling to me, and started to dig in. It wasn't easy; my first reading of ENQUIRY INTO HUMAN UNDERSTANDING was like having my face smashed into a brick wall: it was almost impenetrable. The important word there is "almost", since I still managed to pick enough gems to justify a second reading ... and then a third ... and a fourth. I must have read the book about ten times by now.
On having done so, I can say that Hume is by no means an obscurantist, indeed he is elegantly clear. However, the problem for the modern reader is that his writing style is antique and takes some getting used to; apparently, it was seen as unconventional in Hume's time. In addition, Hume also took on difficult topics, many of them soaked in confusion -- the free will question, for example, and in particular "necessary connection". I ended up writing this document, and the others in my series on Hume, partly to tie up my studies on his work; but more to provide a "guided tour" of Hume's thinking to make it more accessible. Hume deserves a wider audience. Of course, I have to apologize in advance for any misrepresentations I may have made of him.
The primary source for this document was, of course, the ENQUIRY INTO HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. There were also some comments TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, and essays such as "Of The Immortality Of The Soul". The banner illustration was taken in 2006 by a shooter only identified as "get directly down", the image being titled "Jim Breaks". It was released for commercial use under the Creative Commons Share Alike License / Attribution.
* Revision history:
v1.0.0 / 01 sep 20 v1.1.0 / 01 feb 22 / Considerable tidying-up. v1.1.1 / 01 dec 23 / Review & polish.BACK_TO_TOP
